New vehicle sales in the U.S. fell nearly 40 percent during the last recession, causing significant job losses and unprecedented government interventions in the auto industry. This paper explores two potential explanations for this decline: falling home values and falling households' income expectations. First, we establish that declining home values explain only a small portion of the observed reduction in vehicle sales. Using a county-level panel from the episode, we find: (1) A one-dollar fall in home values reduced new vehicle spending by about 0.9 cents; and (2) Falling home values explain approximately 19 percent of the aggregate vehicle spending decline. Next, examining state-level data from 1997-2016, we find: (3) The short-run responses of vehicle consumption to home value changes are larger in the 2005-2011 period relative to other years, but at longer horizons (e.g. 5 years), the responses are similar across the two sub-periods; and (4) The service flow from vehicles, as measured from miles traveled, responds very little to house price shocks. We also detail the sources of the differences between our findings (1) and (2) from existing research. Second, we establish that declining current and expected future income expectations played an important role in the auto market's collapse. We build a permanent income model augmented to include infrequent, repeated car buying. Our calibrated model matches the pre-recession distribution of auto vintages and exhibits a large vehicle sales decline in response to a moderate decline in expected permanent income. In response to the decline in permanent income, households delay replacing existing vehicles, allowing them smooth the effects of the income shock without significantly adjusting the service flow from their vehicles. Combining our negative results regarding housing wealth with our positive model-based findings, we interpret the auto market collapse as consistent with existing permanent income based approaches to durable goods consumption (e.g., Leahy and Zeira (2005)).
We study the interaction of information transmission in loan-backed asset markets and screening
effort in a general equilibrium framework. Originating banks can screen their borrowers, but can
inform investors of their asset type only through an error-prone rating technology. The premium
paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of screening effort. Because the
rating technology is imperfect, this premium is insufficient to induce the efficient level of screening.
However, the fact that banks know their asset quality and produce public information accordingly
helps keep the premium high. Mandatory rating and mandatory ratings disclosure policies interfere
with this decision margin, thereby reducing informativeness of high ratings, lowering the premium
paid on them, and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem. Policies that work to increase
accuracy and/or cost of rating technology can help restore efficiency. If, as in Skreta and Veldkamp
(2009), we associate the expansion leading up to the recent financial crisis with declining rating
accuracy, our model helps interpret several puzzling pre-crisis observations: laxer screening effort,
intensified rating activity, ratings inflation, the decline in the premium paid on highly rated assets,
and rising prevalence of triple-A ratings. The same model mechanism also helps explain the variation
in default rates across asset classes documented in Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2017).
As a form of investment, the importance of capital reallocation between firms has been increasing
over time, with the purchase of used capital accounting for 25% to 40% of firms total investment
nowadays. Cross- firm reallocation of used capital also exhibits intriguing business-cycle properties,
such as (i) the illiquidity of used capital is countercyclical (or the quantity of used capital reallocation
across rms is procyclical), (ii) the prices of used capital are procyclical and more so than those of new
capital goods, and (iii) the dispersion of firms' TFP or MPK (or the bene t of capital reallocation)
is countercyclical. We build a search-based neoclassical model to qualitatively and quantitatively
explain these stylized facts. We show that search frictions in the capital market are essential for our
empirical success but not sufficient---fi nancial frictions and endogenous movements in the distribution
of rm-level TFP (or MPK) and interactions between used-capital investment and new investment
are also required to simultaneously explain these stylized facts, especially that prices of used capital
are more volatile than that of new investment and the dispersion of firm TFP is countercyclical.
Banking models in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
rely on sequential service to explain belief driven runs. But the run-like
phenomena witnessed during the nancial crisis of 200708 occurred
in the wholesale shadow banking sector where sequential service is
largely absent. This suggests that something other than sequential
service is needed to help explain runs. We show that in the absence
of sequential service runs can easily occur whenever bank-funded in-
vestments are subject to increasing returns to scale consistent with
available evidence. Our framework is used to understand and evalu-
ate recent banking and money market regulations.
This paper studies the industry-level and aggregate implications of financial development on international trade. I set up a multi-industry general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms subject to financial frictions. Industries differ in capital-intensity, which leads to differences in external finance dependence. The model is parameterized to match key features of firm-level data. Financial development leads to substantial reallocation of international trade shares from labor- to capital-intensive industries, with minor effects at the aggregate-level. These findings are consistent with estimates from cross-country industry-level and aggregate data.
We study a model of endogenous means testing where households differ in their income and where the in-kind transfer received by each household declines linearly with income. Majority voting determines the two dimensions of public policy: the size of the welfare program and the means-testing rate. We establish the existence of a sequential majority voting equilibrium, when the households vote first on the size of the program and then on the means-testing rate. We show that the means-testing rate increases with the size of the program but the fraction and the identity of the households receiving the transfers are independent of the program size.
Sovereign debt crises generally involve debt restructurings characterized by a mix of face-value haircuts and debt maturity extensions. The prevalence of maturity extensions has been hard to reconcile with economic theory. We develop a new quantitative model of endogenous sovereign debt restructuring that captures key stylized facts of sovereign debt and restructuring episodes. While debt dilution pushes in the direction of negative maturity extensions, three factors are quantitatively important in overcoming the effects of debt dilution and generating maturity extensions: (i) income recovery after default, (ii) credit exclusion after restructuring, and (iii) regulatory costs of book-value haircuts. Methodologically, we implement dynamic discrete choice solution methods that allow for smoother decision rules, rendering the problem tractable.
This paper develops a theory of investment and maturity choices and studies its implications for the macroeconomy. The novel ingredient is an explicit secondary market with trading frictions which leads to a liquidity spread which increases with maturity and generates an upward sloping yield curve. As a result, trading frictions induce firms to borrow and invest at shorter horizons than in a frictionless benchmark. Economies with more severe frictions exhibit a steeper yield curve which further affects maturity and investment choices of rms. A model calibrated to match cross-country moments suggests that reductions in trading frictions-a new channel of financial development-can promote economic development. A policy intervention with government-backed financial intermediaries in the secondary market can improve liquidity and reduce the cost of long-term finance which promotes investment in longer-term projects and generates substantial welfare gains.
Poor families have more children and transfer less resources to them. This suggests that family decisions about fertility and transfers dampen intergenerational mobility. To evaluate the quantitative importance of this mechanism, we extend the standard heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model with earnings risk and credit constraints to allow for endogenous fertility, family transfers, and education. The model, estimated to the US in the 2000s, implies that a counterfactual flat income-fertility profile would-through the equalization of initial conditions-increase intergenerational mobility by 7%. The impact of a counterfactual constant transfer per child is twice as large.
We compile a new database of grocery prices in Argentina, with over 9 million observations per day. Our main novel finding is that product prices almost do not vary within stores of a chain (i.e., uniform pricing). We also find that prices do not change significantly with regional conditions or shocks, particularly so for chains that operate in many regions. To study the impact of uniform pricing on both consumers and firms, this paper uses a tractable model based on the trade literature. Motivated by our empirical findings, each firm has to set the same price in both regions. Relative to a counterfactual in which firms can set different prices across regions (i.e., flexible pricing), uniform pricing reduces firms’ profits by 0.4%. Consumers, however, prefer uniform pricing and are willing to give up 6.7% of their income to avoid flexible pricing in the baseline model. The effect on consumers, however, depends on how much uniform pricing limits firms’ power to extract consumer surplus and how heterogeneous the regions are.
This paper stresses a new channel through which global financial linkages contribute to the
co-movement in economic activity across countries. We show in a two-country setting with
borrowing constraints that international credit markets are subject to self-fulfilling variations
in the world real interest rate. Those expectation-driven changes in the borrowing cost in turn
act as global shocks that induce strong cross-country co-movements in both financial and real
variables (such as asset prices, GDP, consumption, investment and employment). When firms
around the world benefit from unexpectedly low debt repayments today, they borrow and invest
more, which leads to excessive supply of collateral and of loanable funds at a low interest rate,
thus fueling a boom in both home and foreign economies. As a consequence, business cycles
are synchronized internationally. Such a stylized model thus offers one way to rationalize both
the existence of world business-cycle factor documented by recent empirical studies through
dynamic factor analysis and such a factor’s intimate link to global financial markets.
We develop a N-sector business cycle network model a la Long and Plosser (1983),
featuring heterogenous money demand a la Bewley (1980) and Lucas (1980). Despite
incomplete markets and a well-defined distribution of real money balances across heteroge-
neous households, the enriched N-sector network model remains analytically tractable with
closed-form solutions up to the aggregate level. Relying on the tractability, we establish
several important results: (i) The economys input-output network linkages become en-
dogenously time-varying over the business cyclethanks to the influence of the endogenous
distribution of money demand on cross-sector allocations of commodities. (ii) Despite flex-
ible prices, money is neither neutral nor superneutral and transitory monetary injections
can generate highly persistent effects on sectoral output, thanks to the time-varying distri-
bution of money demand and its effect on input-output coefficients. (iii) Although money
injection is distributed equally across households by design, the real effects are asymmetric
across production sectors, e.g., the impact of money is strongest on downstream sectors that
purchase intermediate goods from the rest of the economy, but weakest on upstream sectors
that supply intermediate goods to the other sectors, in sharp contrast to the case of sectoral
technology shocks and government spending shocks. Our model also shows that movements
in the distribution of money demand could be an important source of the measured labor
wedge documented by the business cycle accounting literature.
We examine housing vacancy rates over time and space using Markov-switching models. Our theoretical analysis extends a standard search and matching model for housing by incorporating regime-switching behavior and interregional spillovers. Such an approach is strongly supported by our empirical results. Our estimations allow us to examine differences in vacancy rates as well as explore the possibility of asymmetries within and across housing markets, depending on the state/regime of a given housing market. Estimated vacancy rates, conditional on the vacancy regime, vary across regions in all models. Models allowing for interregional effects tend to perform better than models lacking this feature. These models track vacancies well. Noteworthy is their performance during the Great Recession/Financial Crisis. The importance and diversity of interregional effects are demonstrated, and vacancies in a specific Census region are affected by vacancies in other regions. Moreover, the sizes of these effects depend on the vacancy state of the specific region.
The benefits of implementing Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs)
are studied in the presence of the multiple sources of information frictions often
existing in developing countries. A benchmark incomplete markets economy is
calibrated to Mexico in the early 2000s. The unconstrained optimal allocation
would imply very large welfare gains relative to the benchmark economy (similar to
an increase in consumption of 23% in every period). More importantly, in presence
of multiple sources of information frictions, about half of those potential gains can
be accrued through the implementation of UISAs with replacement rates between
40-50%, contribution rates between 10-15%, an initial liquidity transfer of about 20
quarters of average income, and higher payroll taxes to finance those initial stocks.
This paper studies the role of the patterns of production and international trade on the higher business cycle volatility of emerging economies. We study a multi-sector small open economy in which firms produce and trade commodities and manufactures. We estimate the model to match key cross-sectional differences across countries: emerging economies run trade surpluses in commodities
and trade deficits in manufactures, while sectoral trade flows are balanced in developed economies. We find that these differences amplify the response of emerging economies to fluctuations in commodity prices. We show evidence consistent with these findings using cross-country data.
We use regional variation in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009-2012)
to analyze the eect of government spending on consumer spending. Our consumption data
come from household-level retail purchases in Nielsen and auto purchases from Equifax credit
balances. We estimate that a $1 increase in county-level government spending increases consumer spending by $0.18. We translate the regional consumption responses to an aggregate
fiscal multiplier using a multi-region, New Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents and
incomplete markets. Our model successfully generates the estimated positive local multiplier, a result that distinguishes our incomplete markets model from models with complete markets. The aggregate consumption multiplier is 0.4, which implies an output multiplier higher than one. The aggregate consumption multiplier is almost twice the local estimate because trade linkages propagate government spending across regions.
We present a model which considers both regulatory burden of offshoring barriers and possible terms of trade gains from such barriers. Non-tariff barriers are shown to be unambiguously welfare-reducing, and tariff barriers raise welfare only when associated terms-of-trade gains exceed resulting regulatory burdens, in which case there is a positive optimal offshoring tax. Otherwise, free trade is optimal. Welfare reductions from an offshoring tax are more likely with several developed nations engaging in offshoring. We derive and characterize the Nash equilibrium in such a case.
We examine the conduct of monetary policy in a world where the supply of outside money is controlled by the fiscal authority-a scenario increasingly relevant for many developed economies today. Central bank control over the long-run inflation rate depends on whether fiscal policy is Ricardian or Non-Ricardian. The optimal monetary policy follows a generalized Friedman rule that eliminates the liquidity premium on scarce treasury debt. We derive conditions for determinacy under both fiscal regimes and show that they do not necessarily correspond to the Taylor principle. In addition, Non-Ricardian regimes may suffer from multiplicity of steady-states when the government runs persistent deficits.
With rapid industrial upgrading along the global value chain of manufactured goods, China has transformed, within one generation, from an impoverished agrarian society to a middle-income nation as well as the largest manufacturing powerhouse in the world. This article identifies the pattern of China’s industrial upgrading and compares it with those of other successfully industrialized economies and the failed ones. We find that (i) China (since 1978) followed essentially the same path of industrial upgrading as that of Japan and the “Asian Tigers.” These economies succeeded in catching up with the developed western world by going through three developmental stages sequentially; namely, a proto-industrialization in the rural areas, a first industrial revolution featuring mass production of labor-intensive light consumer goods, and then a second industrial revolution featuring mass production of the means of mass production (i.e., capital-intensive heavy industrial good s such as steel, machine tools, electronics, automobiles, communication and transport infrastructures). (ii) In contrast, economies stuck in the low-income trap or middle-income trap did not follow the above sequential stages of industrialization. For example, many Eastern European and Latin American countries after WWII jumped to the stage of heavy industrialization without fully developing their labor-intensive light industries, and thus stagnated in the middle-income trap. Also, there is a clear lack of proto-industrialization in the rural areas for many African economies that have remained in the low-income trap. We believe that laissez-faire and “free market” alone is unable to trigger industrial upgrading. Instead, correct government-led bottom-up industrial policies are the key to escaping the low- and middle-income traps.
When constructing unconditional point forecasts, both direct- and iterated-multistep (DMS and IMS) approaches are common. However, in the context of producing conditional forecasts, IMS approaches based on vector autoregressions (VAR) are far more common than simpler DMS models. This is despite the fact that there are theoretical reasons to believe that DMS models are more robust to misspecification than are IMS models. In the context of unconditional forecasts, Marcellino, Stock, and Watson (MSW, 2006) investigate the empirical relevance of these theories. In this paper, we extend that work to conditional forecasts. We do so based on linear bivariate and trivariate models estimated using a large dataset of macroeconomic time series. Over comparable samples, our results reinforce those in MSW: the IMS approach is typically a bit better than DMS with significant improvements only at longer horizons. In contrast, when we focus on the Great Moderation sample we find a marked improvement in the DMS approach relative to IMS. The distinction is particularly clear when we forecast nominal rather than real variables where the relative gains can be substantial.
The design of lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus. During sovereign crises, central bank provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes banks to purchase high-yield eligible collateral securities matching the maturity of the central bank loans. Using unique security-level data, we find that the European Central Bank's 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation caused Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds, equivalent to 10.6% of amounts outstanding, and pledge them to obtain central bank liquidity. The steepening of eurozone peripheral sovereign yield curves right after the policy announcement is consistent with the equilibrium effects of this "collateral trade."
Using recently available proprietary panel data, we show that while many (35%) US consumers experience financial distress at some point in the life cycle, most of the events of financial distress are primarily concentrated in a much smaller proportion of consumers in persistent trouble. Roughly 10% of consumers are distressed for more than a quarter of the life cycle, and less than 10% of borrowers account for half of all distress events. These facts can be largely accounted for in a straightforward extension of a workhorse model of defaultable debt that accommodates a simple form of heterogeneity in time preference but not otherwise.
How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; ii) the impact of regulation; and iii) how bank closures exacerbated the post-war bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new banks). Deposit insurance amplified the impact of rising crop prices on bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Banks that responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing in the bust, and counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices.
The relationship between venture capital and growth is examined using an endogenous growth model incorporating dynamic contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. At each stage of financing, venture capitalists evaluate the viability of startups. If viable, venture capitalists provide funding for the next stage. The success of a project depends on the amount of funding. The model is confronted with stylized facts about venture capital; viz., statistics by funding round concerning the success rates, failure rates, investment rates, equity shares, and IPO values. Raising capital gains taxation reduces growth and welfare.
Many models in the business cycle literature generate counter-cyclical price markups. This paper examines if the prominent models in the literature are consistent with the empirical findings of micro-level markup behavior in Hong (2016). In particular, I test the markup behavior of the following two models: (i) an oligopolistic competition model, and (ii) a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous price stickiness. First, I explore the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model of oligopolistic competition, in which markups are an increasing function of firm market shares. Coupled with an exogenous uncertainty shock as in Bloom (2009), i.e. a second-moment shock to firm productivities in recessions, this model results in a countercyclical average markup, as in the data. However, in contrast with the data, this model predicts that smaller firms reduce their markups. Second, I calibrate both Calvo and menu cost models of price stickiness to match the empirical heterogeneity in price dura tions across small and large firms, as in Goldberg and Hellerstein (2011). I find that both models can match the average counter-cyclicality of markups in response to monetary shocks. Furthermore, since small firms adjust prices less frequently, they exhibit greater markup counter-cyclicality, consistent with the empirical patterns. Quantitatively, however, only the menu cost model, through its selection effect, can match the extent of the empirical heterogeneity in markup cyclicality. In addition, both sticky price models imply pro-cyclical markup behavior in response to productivity shocks.
This paper studies the importance of firm-level price-markup dynamics for business cycle fluctuations. Using state-of-the-art IO techniques to measure the behavior of markups over the business cycle at the firm level, I find that markups are counter-cyclical with an average elasticity of -1.1 with respect to real GDP. Importantly, I find substantial heterogeneity in markup cyclicality across firms, with small firms having significantly more counter-cyclical markups than large firms. Then, I develop a general equilibrium model by embedding customer capital (due to deep habits as in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006) into a standard Hopenhayn (1992) model of firm dynamics with entry and exit. The calibrated model replicates these empirical facts and produces counter-cyclical firm sales dispersions consistent with the data. The resulting input misallocation amplifies both the volatility and persistence of the aggregate productivity shocks driving the business cycle.
In this paper, we explore the proposition that the optimal capital income tax is zero using an overlapping generations model. We prove that for a large class of preferences, the optimal capital income tax along the transition path and in steady state is non-zero. For a version of the model calibrated to the US economy, we find that the model could justify the observed rates of capital income taxation for an empirically reasonable intertemporal utility function and a robust demographic structure.
In November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the first of a series of unconventional monetary policies, which would include asset purchases and forward guidance, to reduce long-term interest rates. We investigate the behavior of shorts, considered sophisticated investors, before and after FOMC announcements not fully anticipated in spot bond markets. Short interest in Treasury and agency securities declined prior to expansionary anouncements, indicating shorts anticipated these surprises, and declined further after these announcements. The failure of shorts to reinstitute their positions after the last purchase announcement confirms that the Fed convinced sophisticated investors that interest rates would remain low.
Using a model with housing search, endogenous credit constraints, and mortgage default, this paper accounts for the housing crash from 2006 to 2011 and its implications for aggregate and cross-sectional consumption during the Great Recession. Left tail shocks to labor market uncertainty and tighter down payment requirements emerge as the key drivers. An endogenous decline in housing liquidity amplifies the recession by increasing foreclosures, contracting credit, and depressing consumption. Balance sheets act as a transmission mechanism from housing to consumption that depends on gross portfolio positions and the leverage distribution. Low interest rate policies accelerate the recovery in housing and consumption.
We provide a uniﬁed framework for quantifying the cross-country and cross-sector interactions among trade, innovation, and knowledge diffusion. We study the effect of trade liberalization in a multi-country, multi-sector endogenous growth model in which comparative advantage and the stock of knowledge are determined by innovation and diffusion. A reduction in trade costs induces a re-allocation of comparative advantage in production and innovation across sectors, which translates into higher growth along the counterfactual balanced growth path (BGP). Heterogeneous knowledge diffusion across country-sectors ampliﬁes the specialization effects of trade-induced R&D re-allocation, becoming an additional source of growth and welfare.