Review

An overview of this Review issue.

This article examines the history of antitrust policy on mergers of ATM networks. The author notes that a series of ATM network mergers have resulted in virtual monopolies of ATM systems within large regions of the country.

The author notes that a series of ATM network mergers have resulted in virtual monopolies of ATM systems within large regions of the country. He interprets the actions of the antitrust authorities (including the Federal Reserve in its role of approving acquisitions by bank holding companies) as reflecting the view that regional ATM networks have characteristics of natural monopolies.

The authors focus largely on a court case involving Visa and Discover Card. Visa denied an application for membership by a depository institution owned by Discover Card, and Discover Card sued Visa. The authors’ analysis of this case includes evidence that the entry of aggressive competitors into the Visa credit card network made the credit card industry more competitive.

McAndrews examines the arguments of Carlton and Frankel concerning two aspects of the market for credit cards: interchange fees and duality. Interchange fees involve the payments from banks that issued cards to the banks that received the deposits of the merchants that accepted the credit cards as means of payments.

Economides examines the competitive implications of payment system networks from the perspective of his research on other industries characterized as networks, such as the telephone industry. He suggests a solution to the natural monopoly issue that is being implemented in other network industries: connectivity.