This paper studies the effects of interregional spillovers from the government spending component of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act). Using
cross-county Census Journey to Work commuting data, we cluster U.S. counties into local labor markets, each of which we further partition into two subregions.
This paper explores the contribution of the structural transformation and urbanization process in the housing market in China. City migration flows combined with an
inelastic land supply, due to entry restrictions, has raised house prices.
This article develops time-series models to represent three alternative, potential monetary policy regimes as monetary policy returns to normal. The first regime is a return to the high and volatile inflation rate of the 1970s.
A model is constructed in which households and banks have incent-
ives to fake the quality of collateral. These incentive problems matter
when collateral is scarce in the aggregate when real interest rates are
Using retrospective data, we introduce evidence that occupational exposure significantly affects disability risk. Incorporating this into a general equilibrium model, social disability insurance (SDI) affects welfare through (i) the classic, risk-sharing channel and (ii) a new
channel of occupational reallocation.
This paper studies the effect of government stimulus spending on a novel aspect of the labor market: the differential impact of spending on the total wage bill versus employment. We analyze the 2009 Recovery Act via instrumental variables using a new instrument, the spending done by federal agencies that were not instructed to target funds towards harder hit regions.
China’s housing prices have been growing nearly twice as fast as national income over the past decade, despite a high vacancy rate and a high rate of return to capital. This paper interprets China’s housing boom as a rational bubble emerging naturally from its economic transition.
In the wake of the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate (FFR) target essentially to zero and resorted to unconventional monetary policy. With the nominal FFR constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) for an extended period, empirical monetary models cannot be estimated as usual.
The 1950s are often pointed to as a decade in which the Federal Reserve operated a particularly successful monetary policy. The present paper examines the evolution of Federal Reserve monetary policy from the mid-1930s through the 1950s in an effort to understand better the apparent success of policy in the 1950s.
A model of money, credit, and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium — an upward-sloping nominal yield curve.
Event studies show that the Federal Reserve’s announcements of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases had large and desired effects on asset prices but these studies do not tell us how long such effects last.
In 2005, reforms made formal personal bankruptcy much more costly. Shortly after, the US
began to experience its most severe recession in seventy years, and while personal bankruptcy
rates rose, they rose only modestly given the severity of the rise in unemployment.
Mortgages are long-term nominal loans. Under incomplete asset markets, monetary policy
is shown to affect housing investment and the economy through the cost of new mortgage
borrowing and the value of payments on outstanding debt.
The consensus in monetary policy circles that the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing (QE), have significantly reduced long-term yields is due in part to event studies, which show that long-term yields decline on QE announcement days.
We consider the effect of some policies intended to shorten recessions and accelerate recoveries. Our innovation is to analyze the duration of the recoveries of various U.S. states, which
gives us a cross-section of both state- and national-level policies.
We study the use of intermediated assets as media of exchange in a neoclassical growth model. An intermediary is delegated control over productive capital and finances itself by issuing claims against the revenue generated by its operations.