This paper analyzes the sources of the racial difference in the intergenerational transmission of human
capital by developing and estimating a dynastic model of parental time and monetary inputs in early childhood with endogenous fertility, home hours, labor supply, marriage, and divorce.
This paper develops measures of the costs and benefits of governance regulations
within a dynamic principal agent model of hidden information and moral
hazard following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).
As an alternative to ordinary least squares (OLS), we estimate location values for single family houses using a standard housing price and characteristics dataset by local polynomial regressions (LPR), a semi-parametric procedure.
Rising costs of and returns to college have led to sizeable increases in the demand for
student loans in many countries. In the U.S., student loan default rates have also risen
for recent cohorts as labor market uncertainty and debt levels have increased.
This paper (i) estimates the local effects of government stimulus spending on labor market
outcomes and (ii) shows how these effects can be obtained from a firm's optimal policy in the
presence of costs to hiring workers.
We study the roles private information and capital accumulation play in the structure of
partnerships. Partnerships are ventures formed with capital contributions from two members
who initially share ownership of a business.
How do job losers use default -- a phenomenon 6x more prevalent than bankruptcy
--as a type of “informal" unemployment insurance, and more importantly, what are
the social costs and benefits of this behavior?
The recent financial crisis has focused attention on the relationship between access to finance and international trade, triggering a burgeoning segment of the literature evaluating this link empirically.
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries stand out in international comparisons of de jure obstacles to female employment and entrepreneurship. These obstacles manifest themselves in low rates of female labor participation, entrepreneurship, and ownership.
In this paper, we study the welfare consequences of imposing alternative regimes of
competition between two local governments that compete for mobile firms which have
private information on their degree of mobility.
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems,
finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in
the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case.
We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding
an opponent’s intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of
information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s code-of-conduct,
and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.