#1990-004A "When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy with Private Information"
by Michelle R. Garfinkel, and Seonghwan Oh
June 1990

This paper analyzes how noisy or imprecise announcements might partially remove the inefficiencies resulting from the credibility problem in monetary policy when the presence of non-verifiable private information adds another dimension to that problem. The analysis finds that imprecise or noisy announcements can be a meaningful form of communication only if it is possible to "tie" the hands of the monetary authority somehow. More...

#1990-001A "Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Periods"
by Michelle R. Garfinkel, and Seonghwan Oh


This paper analyzes the optimal choice of the length of time over which the monetary authority targets money growth, in a setting where the monetary authority’s lack of credibility potentially gives rise to an inflationary bias. More...