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Working Paper 1992-002A Search | View by Year | View by Category | View by Author "The Slack Banker Dances: Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking in the Banking Collapse of the 1920s" This paper studies the effects of deposit insurance on bank behavior using individual bank data from Kansas in the 1920s. Kansas banks were severely stressed by the collapse of agricultural prices in 1920 and resulting increase in farm mortgage defaults. Because membership in the state deposit insurance system was voluntary, it is possible to compare the behavior of insured and non-insured banks facing similar exogenous circumstances. We find that deposit insurance encouraged excessive risk-taking, which helps to explain the comparatively high failure rate of insured banks. The deposit insurance fund ultimately failed Full Text - Acrobat PDF (1.6M) Notify Me of Updates for: |
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