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Working Paper 1985-014A Search | View by Year | View by Category | View by Author "Risk Aversion, Risk Sharing, and Joint Bidding: A Study of Outer Continental Shelf Petroleum Auctions" The bidding decision by firms in OCS petroleum auctions is modeled as an application of the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. This theory is apt since OCS leases are innately risky investments: during 1954-1969, 77percent of the Gulf of Mexico leases were unprofitable, while the average bonus (price) was $2,228,000. The model of the simultaneous choices of bid level, share in joint bids, and bids on other tracts in the same auction is tested on 17 auctions during 1968-1975. Empirical results support the hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion and the risk-pooling explanation of joint bidding. Full Text - Acrobat PDF (10.7M) Notify Me of Updates for: |
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