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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis working papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critial comment.

Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

Monetary Policy, the Tax Code, and the Real Effects of Energy Shocks

This paper develops a monetary model with taxes to account for the apparently asymmetric and time-varying effects of energy shocks on output and hours worked in post-World War II U.S. data.

Too Big to Cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships

This paper studies the efficient arrangement among several agents that are subject to idiosyncratic, privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption.

Analysis of Numerical Errors

This paper provides a general framework for the quantitative analysis of stochastic dynamic models. We review convergence properties of some numerical algorithms and available methods to bound approximation errors.

Multi-Step Ahead Forecasting of Vector Time Series

This paper develops the theory of multi-step ahead forecasting for vector time series that exhibit temporal nonstationarity and co-integration.

Bankruptcy and Delinquency in a Model of Unsecured Debt

Limited commitment for the repayment of unsecured consumer debt originates from two places: (i) formal bankruptcy laws granting a partial or complete legal removal of unsecured debts under certain circumstances, and (ii) informal default followed by renegotiation, "delinquency."

Why Doesn’t Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?

What determines the technology that a country adopts? While there could be many factors, the efficiency of the country’s financial system may play a significant role.

Consistent Testing for Structural Change at the Ends of the Sample

In this paper we provide analytical and Monte Carlo evidence that Chow and Predictive tests can be consistent against alternatives that allow structural change to occur at either end of the sample.

Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring

We present evidence that fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed is the most relevant incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance.


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