Contact Info
Email: david@dklevine.com
Mailing Address:
Department of Economics
Campus Box, 1208
Washington University
St. Louis, MO 63130-3629
David Levine
Research Fellow
Selected Publications
"Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," (with D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole), in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed. Alvin E. Roth, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 73-98, 1985.
"Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies," (with T. Kehoe), Econometrica, 53: 433-453, 1985.
"Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," (with D. Fudenberg), Econometrica, 57: 759-778, 1989.
"Efficiency and the Value of Money," Review of Economic Studies, 56: 77-88, 1989.
"Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," (with D. Fudenberg), Review of Economic Studies, 59: 561-580, 1992.

